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The relationship between income inequality and economic growth is re-examined using 
a semiparametric, dynamic panel data model.  Significant empirical evidence is 
uncovered supporting the theory that the relationship between these variables is 
nonlinear.  Additionally, the evidence also supports the conclusion that other 
important economic variables, notably past inequality and the rate of investment, 
directly affect the relationship between base period inequality and subsequent 5-year 
growth.  The results of this paper suggest that higher income inequality (regardless of 
the magnitude of change) and small reductions in income inequality both reduce 
subsequent growth.  Interestingly, large reductions in income inequality are growth 
promoting.  Moreover, it is found that lower investment rates mitigate the negative 
effects of higher inequality on growth.  It is shown that these results, collectively, are 
consistent with both a simple political economy model with costly bargaining and an 
economic growth model with capital-skill complementarities and imperfect credit 
markets. 
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1 Introduction 
  Does the distribution of income impact the rate of economic growth?  The 
answer to this question has obvious and important implications for policy makers.  As 
a result, it is not surprising that economists have vigorously debated the answer to 
this question and in the process have produced a large body of work, including a 
wealth of both theoretical models and empirical studies. Unfortunately, little consensus 
has emerged regarding the true relationship between inequality and growth.  This lack 
of consensus, as it pertains to empirical studies, can be explained in part by differences 
in growth horizons, conditioning variables, estimation techniques, data, and the 
functional form of the regression models.  This paper will focus on the latter two 
issues, and in particular will demonstrate that flexible estimation techniques, which 
allow for nonlinearity in the conditional mean of the economic growth rate, produce 
results that are contrary to much of the recent literature.  But before exploring this 
paper’s results in more detail, it is helpful to briefly summarize the results of the 
existing literature. 
  In 1994, Persson and Tabellini, and Alesina and Rodrik independently produced 
cross-sectional models where the long-run economic growth rate over the time period 
in question (20 to 25 years) was explained by a linear set of variables measured at the 
beginning of the time period.  Despite differences in variable definitions and 
conditioning variables, both papers reached similar conclusions: initial income 
inequality is harmful to subsequent, long-run economic growth.
1  Several other papers, 
seeking to improve upon the basic models employed above, were published in the 
1990s with similar results (see Clarke (1995) and Alesina and Perotti (1996)). 
However, this empirical regularity was seriously challenged by the introduction of the 
Deininger and Squire (1996) panel dataset on income inequality.
2
  Making use of the Deininger and Squire (1996) panel data set, Li and Zou 
(1998) and Forbes (2000) developed fixed effects versions of existing cross-country 
growth models.  Both papers found a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between beginning of period income inequality and subsequent 5-year economic 
growth.  These results were robust to minor changes in the models, including 
differences in inequality measurement (i.e. gini coefficients, income shares).
3  However, 
other panel data investigations did not find a positive relationship between inequality 
and growth. 
  2  Using three-stage least squares, Barro (2000) estimated a random effects panel 
system and found that the relationship between inequality and subsequent 10-year 
economic growth was statistically insignificant.  Exploring this relationship further, 
however, Barro found that inequality promoted growth in wealthier nations, and 
reduced growth in poorer nations.  This discrepancy between Barro (2000) and Forbes 
(2000), could conceivably be a  reflection of differences in modeling country-specific 
effects (i.e. the use of random versus fixed effects), the length of time horizons used 
(10-year versus 5-year subsequent growth), the use of differing subsets of the Deininger 
and Squire (1996) panel data set (Forbes exclusively used the “high quality” portion of 
the dataset while Barro used a much larger dataset that included observations with 
vague or unidentified primary sources), and to a lesser extent differences in control 
variables (Forbes’ model does not include a policy variable representing government 
spending, conditional convergence, inflation or capital investment).
4  However, 
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) argue quite convincingly that the true reason for the 
numerous differences in the existing literature stems from a single problem: neglected 
nonlinearity. 
  Banerjee and Duflo (2003) demonstrated that if there exist nonlinear 
relationships between income inequality (and/or changes in income inequality) and 
subsequent economic growth, and if a linear model is mistakenly used to estimate this 
relationship, then the estimated reduced form coefficients of the linear model are 
actually functions of the unidentified structural coefficients of the non-linear model.  
Depending upon the specification of the linear model (e.g. fixed or random effects, and 
the included conditioning variables), positive or negative estimated (reduced form) 
coefficients on inequality reflect different underlying functions of the actual structural 
parameters.  They found strong evidence that nonlinear relationships between 1) 
changes in income inequality and growth and 2) lagged income inequality and growth, 
exist in the data, supporting their assertion that the previous literature suffers from 
significant misspecification problems.  In particular, they found that changes in income 
inequality, regardless of the direction, reduce economic growth.  Additionally, they 
found no relationship between beginning of period inequality and subsequent growth, 
but they did not find a negative relationship between lagged income inequality and 
subsequent growth. 
  This paper, while similar to Banerjee and Duflo (2003) in some aspects, differs 
in two crucial ways:  First, this paper investigates whether factors in addition to 
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current this paper uses a fixed effects panel instead of a random effects panel. 
  As a result of this alternative and more flexible specification, it will be shown 
that both increases in income inequality (regardless of the magnitude) and small 
reductions in income inequality reduce economic growth rates, but that large 
reductions in inequality actually bolsters economic performance.  While not 
inconsistent with the political economy model discussed in Section 2 below, it does 
suggest that the nature of political bargaining processes (and their impact on economic 
performance) may be more complicated than first suspected.  In addition, the results 
of this paper are also consistent with several of the implications of class of economic 
growth models with capital-skill complementarity.  First, it is shown that less 
developed nations experience lower reductions in growth as the result of an increase 
income inequality.  Second, it is shown that as a nation develops, the impact of 
changes in the distribution of income on economic performance diminishes. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will briefly outline 
two important channels through which inequality can impact growth.  Section 3 will 
layout the empirical methodology and data used in this paper.  Section 4 will estimate 
the semiparametric model used in this paper and discuss the results.  Finally, Section 
5 will conclude.  
 
2  Nonlinear Channels between Inequality and Growth 
  In the absence of very strong assumptions regarding political processes, 
technology, preferences, endowments, the convexity of the factors of production (e.g. 
capital), and the completeness of markets, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) demonstrate that 
there is no reason to assume that the relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth is linear.  That being said, this paper will focus on two non-linear 
mechanisms through which inequality can impact growth: 1) an elementary political 
economy bargaining model, and 2) a growth model with physical and human capital 
complementarity. 
 
2.1  Political Economy Bargaining Model 
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) discuss an elementary “hold-up” model whereby two 
competing groups engage in costly negotiations regarding the implementation of 
growth promoting reforms (or investments) and the subsequent distribution of income.  
If a given group (chosen at random) chooses to forego negotiations and immediately 
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be realized and the status quo distribution of income will prevail.  However, if the 
same randomly chosen group instead decides to engage in negotiations, they may 
increase their share of the nation’s income but the resulting growth rate will be lower.  
If the reform/investment is not implemented, the distribution of income will remain 
unchanged and no economic growth will occur.  This bargaining game implies the 
relationship between income inequality and subsequent growth takes the following 
form: 
  ( ) 51 5 it i it it it it it gr y k gini gini X B α β + =+ + − + + ε −  (2.1) 
 
where  55 ( it it it gr y y ++ =− ) 5  is the (annualized) growth rate of country i between period 
t and t+5,  i α  are invariant, nation specific effects,   is the natural log of per capita 
GDP,   is the gini coefficient for country i during period t,   is a general 
function,  is the set of remaining conditioning variables, and 
it y
it gini () k i
it X it ε  are time varying 
shocks.
5  When the gini coefficient is expressed on a 100-point scale, 
, that is to say that the function  :[ 100, 100] [ 1, ) k −+ − + ∞   ( ) k i  maps from the change 
in income inequality (which cannot be smaller than -100 (going from perfect inequality 
to perfect equality) nor larger than +100 (going from perfect equality to inequality)) 
onto the change in per capita GDP (which cannot be smaller than -100%, but can be 
arbitrarily large).  Without loss of generality, the function  ( ) k i  can be rewritten as 
, whereby  5 (, it it h gini gini − ) :[0,100] [0,100] [ 1, ) h × −+ ∞   .  Thus (2.1) can be more 
generally expressed as: 
  ( ) 51 5 , it i it it it it it gr y h gini gini X B α β +− =+ + + + ε  (2.2) 
 
Therefore, if one wishes to capture the effects of political processes on subsequent 
economic performance, a general model like equation (2.2) is appropriate. 
 
2.2  Growth Model with Capital-Skill Complementarity 
Galor and Moav (2002) develop a growth model whereby the simultaneous and 
asymmetric accumulation of physical and human capital drives both the development 
process and the distribution of income.  Within the context of their model, they find 
that during the initial stages of development (when it assumed that both physical and 
human capital are scarce), income inequality promotes growth because it channels 
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propensity to save), which raises aggregate savings and stimulates capital formation. 
As the economy develops and the capital stock rises, assumed complementarities 
between physical and human capital increase the relative importance of human capital 
necessary for sustained growth.  As a result, higher income inequality becomes a 
hindrance to growth, because it retards human capital formation (assuming the 
presence of credit market constraints).  Therefore, during this intermediate stage of 
development, higher growth rates would be associated with lower levels of income 
inequality.  Finally, in the latter stages of development, wages rise and marginal 
propensities to save begin equalize across households, thereby reducing both the 
importance credit market constraints (and thus the benefits of lower inequality) and 
the importance of wealthier households in the capital formation process (and thus the 
benefits of higher inequality).
6  The implications of this growth model are therefore 
consistent with an empirical growth model of the following form: 
  ( ) 51 , it i it it it it it gr y gini inv X B α βκ + =+ + + + ε  (2.3) 
 
where the variables are defined analogously to those in equation (2.1),   is the 
relative size of investment (as a percentage of GDP) and the function   captures 
the nonlinear relationship between growth and inequality, which because of factor 
input complementarities depends upon the breadth and scope of capital markets (as 




  In order to simultaneously model the net effects of these alternative processes, 
equations (2.2) and (2.3) can be nested together to form the following general, 
empirical growth model: 
  ( ) 51 5 ,, it i it it it it it it gr y m gini gini inv X B α β +− =+ + + + ε  (2.4) 
 
where   captures the net, collective effects of a broad class of political economy 
and traditional growth models.  Owing to the generality of the above model, equation 
(2.4) is thus the focus of investigation in this paper. 
() m i
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3  Data Set and Initial Model Estimation 
3.1 Data 
  Conforming to Banerjee and Duflo (2003), Forbes (2000), et. al., this paper 
makes use of the Deininger and Squire dataset.  The remaining dataset values were 
acquired from various sources, including the Penn World tables, World Bank 
Development Indicators, the Barro and Lee dataset, etc.  A complete listing of the 
data sources is provided in Table 1A in Appendix A.  Throughout the remainder of 
the paper, the dependent variable will consist of 5-year growth rates, whereas the 
independent variables will consist of beginning of period values or period averages.  
The panel consists of 246 observations, with a total of 29 nations in the panel, and 
observations per nation ranging from a low of 3 to a high of 26.  A complete listing of 
these nations and the years included is provided in Table 2A in Appendix A. 
 
3.2  Linear Model Estimation 
Before estimating equation (2.4), a short exposition of the empirical properties 
(and deficiencies) of the basic linear fixed effect growth model is instructive.  Thus 
equation (3.1) below is a linear version of equation (2.4) that uses conditioning 
variables ( it X ) very similar to Barro (2000):
7
  51 2 3 it i t it it it it it gr y gini inv X B α ηβ β β ε + =++ + + + + (3.1) 
 
where the variables are defined analogously to those in equation (2.1),  t η  are time 
period dummies, and   is the set of remaining conditioning variables, including the 
square of per capita GDP, average years of secondary education (among males aged 15 
and higher), the fertility rate, the growth rate of the terms of trade, the rate of 
inflation, and government expenditures (as a fraction of GDP), and 
it X
it ε  are 
independent and identically distributed shocks.
8
A scatter plot of the residuals from this model against the gini coefficient is 
provided in Figure 1 (see Appendix B).
9  Clearly, the volatility of these residuals is an 
increasing function of the level of inequality.  Two likely explanations are either 1) 
nations with higher inequality experience greater volatility in their growth rates (i.e. 
growth rates display heteroskedasticity) or 2) there is a more complicated, nonlinear 
relationship between growth and inequality that has been neglected.  It is the 
contention of this paper that this pattern in the residuals is the result of neglected 
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Ullah (1999) test was utilized. 
The Fan-Ullah test is implemented by first obtaining the residuals ( 5 ˆit ε + ) from 
the model being tested for neglected non-linearity (i.e. (2.1) above).   The conditional 
expectations of the residuals are then calculated nonparametrically ( () 5 ˆ ˆit it Eu ξ + ), 
where  it ξ  is the variable(s) that potentially effect the dependent variable ( 5 it gr + ) in a 
non-linear way.  Next, an auxiliary regression is performed in which the original 
residuals ( 5 ˆit ε + ) are regressed on their conditionally expected values from the previous 
step: 
  ( ) 55 ˆ ˆˆ it it it it 5 E v ελ ε ξ + + =⋅ ++  (3.2) 
 
Under the null hypothesis of the test, there is no neglected nonlinearity vis-à-vis  it ξ .  
Thus, a simple t-test is performed on the estimated coefficient  ˆ λ .  If  () 5 ˆ ˆit it Eu ξ +  is 
statistically significant, then the null hypothesis that there is no neglected nonlinearity 
is rejected.  Because of the structure of equation 2.4, nonlinearity with respect to the 
following variables was tested: .  Table 1 in Appendix C provides the 
results of the various Fan-Ullah tests.  In every case, the null hypothesis of no 
neglected nonlinearity is rejected at any standard level of significance, and thus there 
appears to be a nonlinear relationship between each (and every combination) of these 
variables and economic performance.  In order to more directly examine this 
nonlinearity and its impact on economic growth, the following section will use 
semiparametric methods to estimate the general function 
1 , ,  it it it gini gini inv −
( ) m i  from equation 2.4.  
 
4 Semiparametric  Estimation 
4.1 Estimation  Methodology 
  Based on equation (2.4), the following dynamic, fixed effects semiparametric 
panel model will be estimated: 
 
  ( ) 51 1 1 ,, it i t it it it it it it gr y m gini gini inv X B α ηβ ε +− =++ + + + −  (4.1) 
 
  8where lagged investment enters the function  ( ) m i  instead of base period investment in 
order to reduce any potential endogeneity.
10  To begin, equation (4.1) is stacked to 
form the following: 
 
   (4.2) 
12
1 () GR D D Y m Z XB U αη β =++ + + +
 
where  16 17 5 [,, , ] NT GR gr gr gr + ′ ≡ … , 
11 1 1
12 ,,, N Dd d d ⎡ ⎤ ≡ ⎣ ⎦ …  (where   is an   dummy 
variable vector whose elements corresponding to country j are equal to 1), 
1
j d 1 NT ×
[] 12 ,,, N α αα α ′ = … ,   (where 
22 2 2
12 ,,, T Dd d d ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ …
2 dτ  is an   dummy variable 
vector whose elements corresponding to time period 
1 NT ×
τ  are equal to 1), 
[] 12 ,,, T η ηη η ′ = … ,  11 12 [,,, ] NT Yy y y ′ ≡ … ,  ()() ( ) 11 12 () , , , NT mZ mz mz mz ′ ≡ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ … , 
, and  1 (, , it it it it zg i n i g i n i i n v −− ≡ 1 ) ] [ 11 12 ,, , NT XX X X ′ ≡ … .
11  Following a procedure similar 
to Mundra (2004), the conditional expectation of each row of (4.2) is taken with 
respect to its corresponding value of z using nonparametric kernel estimation:
 12
 
  () () ( ) ( ) ()
12
1 () E GR Z E D Z E D Z E Y Z m Z E X Z B αη β =++ + +  (4.3) 
 
where it is important to point out that: 
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The elements of matrices (4.4) and (4.5) above correspond to the conditional 
probability that a randomly chosen observation (from row r of (4.2)) came from a 
given country (or time period) given the value of the conditioning variables (z).  That 
  9is to say  () ()
11
,, Pr 1 jr jr E dz d z ==  and  ( ) ( )
11
,, Pr 1 sr sr E dz d z == .  Thus, for a given 
nation (i) and time period (t), equation (4.3) can be written as: 
 






it it j j it it s s it it it it it it it
js
E gr z E d z E d z E y z m z E X z B αη β +
==
=+ + + + ∑∑ (4.6) 







it j j it s s it it it
js
gr d d y X B αη β +
==
=+ + + ∑∑  (4.7) 
 





11 ,,, WD D Y X −− = ) , where  1 Y−  and  1 X−  are the one-period lagged values of 
and  Y X respectively, and let 
12 (, , ,) X DDYX =   .
13  The OLS instrumental variable 
estimator the just-identified case is thus: 
  () ()
___ 1
1 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ,, , B WX W G R αηβ
− ′ ′ ′ =    (4.8) 
 






















≡∑ ) i t .  Likewise, the second term in 
















zs s i t
s ) i t E dz ηη
=
≡∑ .  As 
demonstrated in Robinson (1988), the common intercept in a semiparametric model is 
unidentified.  As such, the level of the fixed effects parameters ( i α ) in a panel model 
are unidentified, however, the deviations of the fixed effects parameters from their 
conditional means (i.e., 
it iz α α − ) are identified.  Therefore, equation (4.1) will be 
equivalently represented as: 
 
  ( ) 51 () ()
it it it i z t z it it it it gr y m z X B α αη η β + =− +− + + + +   ε  (4.9) 
 
where  .  Replacing the population parameter values in (4.9) 
with their consistently estimated values from (4.8) yields: 
() ()
it it it z z it mz mz αη ≡++  
 
  ( ) 55 1 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ () ()
it it it it i z t z it it it it gr gr y X B m z u αα ηη β ++ ≡− − − − −−= +     (4.10) 
 







zj j i t
j
) i t E dz αα
=







zs s i t
s ) i t E dz ηη
=
≡∑ .  Finally,   can be 
estimated via local linear least squares by solving the following minimization problem: 





51 2 3 ,,,
11
m i n () ( () , () , () ) ,,
i T N
ij ij ij ab b b
ij
gr a z b z b z b z z K z z h +
== ) ( )













gini gini gini gini inv inv
Kz z h
hhh π
−− ⎛⎞ ⎡ ⎤ −− − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ =− + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝⎠
.  
The solution to the foregoing problem is given by: 
  () ()
1
123 ˆˆˆ ˆ,,, ab b b K K g r
− ′ ′ ′ =Ψ Ψ Ψ
   
  (4.12) 
 
where, 
  ( ) 1 z Ψ=  (4.13) 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11,, ,, NT Kd i a g K zz h K z z h =
 
   (4.14) 
 
Fundamentally, this is a first-order Taylor series approximation of   at some 
point z, whereby the function   is equal to 
() it mz  
() az () () mz mz z ′ −∇⋅    , and the slope 
parameters   are the gradient of   (i.e. 
).  Hence, 
( 123 () , () , () bzbzbz ) () mz  
() ( ) 123 () , () , () mz bzbzbz ∇=   ( ) 123 ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ () () () , () , () mz az b z b z b z z ′ = +⋅   .  These 
functions are estimated and analyzed in the following sections. 
 
 
4.2  Estimation Results – Linear Coefficients 
Following the estimation procedure outlined above, the linear coefficients of the 
model were estimated and the slope coefficients (i.e.,  ) are provided in Table 2 in 
Appendix C.  Clearly, the estimated coefficients from this model are similar to Barro 
(2000) and Forbes (2000).  Regarding this paper and Barro (2000), both models 
strongly support conditional convergence. Moreover, both models predict that higher 
government expenditures (as a fraction of GDP), and higher inflation are growth 
reducing, while both models agree that improvement in the terms of trade is growth 
promoting.  However, these models are in disagreement regarding the impact of 
1 ˆ ˆ ,B β
  11fertility on growth.  Barro’s model predicts that fertility is growth reducing, while the 
present paper counter-intuitively predicts that fertility is growth promoting.  With 
regard to the present paper and Forbes (2000), both models predict that education (as 
measured by years of male secondary education) is growth reducing.
14
 
4.3  Estimation Results – The Impact of Inequality on Growth 
In order to estimate the impact of changes in base period inequality on 
subsequent economic growth (i.e. to estimate  [ ] 1 () it it z b z gini gr + =∂∂ 5 ), fixed values of 
lagged inequality and investment must be chosen.  In an attempt to determine 
economically interesting values for  1 it gini −  and  1 it inv − , all available base-period data 
from the 1980s were ranked from poorest to richest nation (in terms of per-capita 
GDP), and the mean values of inequality and investment were determined for the 
poorest 20%, all nations, and the richest 20%, respectively.  The results are provided 
in Table 3 in Appendix C.  Using these three sets of average values, the relationship 
between inequality and subsequent growth was estimated for the typical poor, middle-
class, and rich nation.  A plot of these estimated values (i.e.,  ) is provided in 
Figure 2 in Appendix B. 
1 ˆ () bz
  Several important features jump-out from Figure 2.  First, poor countries with 
their correspondingly low capital stocks and low investment rates enjoy a greater boost 
(or a lower reduction) in output as a result of an increase in income inequality as 
compared to rich nations (i.e.  ).  
Moreover, the marginal impact on growth as a result of higher income inequality is 
roughly equal in middle income and rich nations (i.e. 
).  Both of these facts are consistent 
with the implications of the Galor and Moav (2002) growth model.  More specifically, 
inequality is more conducive to growth in lesser developed countries as it channels 
resources to households who are more likely to augment domestic capital formation.  
But, in more developed (middle income and wealthy) nations, human capital is 
relatively more important in the growth process as compared to physical capital, and 
thus the benefits (if any) of higher income inequality are apt to be smaller. 
_____ ____ _____ ____
11 ˆˆ (, , )(, , poor rich poor rich b gini gini inv b gini gini inv > )
)
_____ ____ _____ ____
11 ˆˆ (, , )(, , middle rich middle rich b gini gini inv b gini gini inv ≈
  The second major feature of Figure 2 is that the threshold levels of inequality, 
beyond which higher inequality becomes growth reducing, roughly correspond to the 
  12average level of inequality for that group.  That is to say, the average level of 
inequality in poor nations is 38.87, and the level of inequality at which point 
 is 36.7.  Likewise, the average level of inequality in all 
nations is 36.88, and the level of inequality at which point 
_____ ____
1 ˆ (, , ) poor poor b gini gini inv ≈ 0
0
_____ ____
1 ˆ (, , ) middle middle b gini gini inv ≈  
is 33.88.  Finally, the average level of inequality in rich nations is 34.53, and the level 
of inequality at which point 
_____ ____
1 ˆ (, , ) rich rich bg i n i g i n i i n v 0 ≈  is 33.49.  In other words, the 
results of this paper support both the results of Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and the 
elementary political economy bargaining model in so far as increases in inequality are 
growth reducing.  However, the results of this paper depart from the results of 
foregoing in that sufficiently large reductions in income inequality are growth 
promoting.  This result is more clearly seen when the values of   from Figure 2 
are plotted against their corresponding changes in inequality (i.e. 
).  The first of these plots 
( ) is provided in Figure 3.  Analogous plots for 
middle income nations ( ) and rich nations 
( ) are provided in Figures 4 and 5 respectively.
() 1 ˆ bz
____ ____ ____
, ,  poor middle rich gini gini gini gini gini gini −− −
_____ ____ ____
1 ˆ (, , )  v s   poor poor poor b gini gini inv gini gini −
_____ ____ ____
1 ˆ (, , )  v s   middle middle middle b gini gini inv gini gini −
_____ ____ ____
1 ˆ (, , )  v s   rich rich rich b gini gini inv gini gini −
15  
Regardless of income (and hence average inequality or level of investment), either 
increases in inequality (regardless of magnitude) or small reductions in inequality are 
associated with lower growth rates.  This result is not necessarily inconsistent with a 
political economy model where constraints are placed on the magnitude of changes in 
the income distribution.  As such, only small, negotiated increases or decreases in 
inequality are allowed.  However, larger changes and technological breakthroughs, not 
subject to actions of social coalitions, may simultaneously reduce income inequality 
and raise medium to long-run growth rates.  Clearly, more research into this aspect of 
political economy models is necessary.   
 
4.4  Estimation Results – The Role of Investment 
To begin, the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the gini coefficient and 
investment were determined for the set of all observations from the 1980s.  Next, a set 
of conditioning values were determined for both the gini coefficient and investment, 
  13starting with their tenth percentile values and were then incremented by one (two in 
the case of income inequality) until the ninetieth percentiles were reached.  Thus, , 
which denotes the set of inequality conditioning values, contains the following 15 
values: 
1 A
{ } 1 26,28,30, ,54 A = … .  The set of all investment conditioning values, , 
contains the following 15 values: 
2 A
{ } 2 15,16, ,29 A = … . 
  Next, the average change in growth as a result of a change in base year 








ba Aa A bg i n i aa
A ∈
∈∈ ≡ ⋅ ∑ ) , ,  (4.15) 
 
The values  1 b  for all the various combinations of the conditioning variables 
( ) are provided in Table 4 of Appendix C.  Finally, the values of  () 12 1 2 , aa A A ∈× 1 b  
from equation (4.15) were averaged over all the inequality conditioning variables: 
 
  () (
11












The value   can be interpreted to represent the average rate of change in 
economic growth as a result of a minute change in income inequality, when a 
particular level of investment prevailed in the previous period (i.e.  ).  A plot of 
the values of   over the various values of investment is provided in Figure 6.  The 
plot is consistent with the predictions of the growth model of Galor and Moav (2002).  
As investment (and presumably the capital stock) rises, the deleterious effects of 
higher income inequality are exacerbated.  However, as the investment rate becomes 
substantially large (presumably the capital stock is large and the economy is in the 
latter stages of development), the ill-effects of higher income inequality subside, as 
represented by the reversion of   toward zero. 
11 ( bi n v −  
1 inv−
1 b  
1 ( bi n v −  
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5 Conclusion 
  Past empirical investigations of the relationship between economic growth and 
income inequality have yielded a broad set of results, including that income inequality 
is harmful to growth, beneficial for growth, and inconsequential to growth.  Although 
models, empirical methodology, and datasets have steadily improved, the empirical 
unit of interest was a single, invariant coefficient on inequality (which entered the 
various models linearly).  Using a nested model consistent with political economy 
models and growth models with capital-skill complementarity, this paper finds 
significant evidence to suggest that the relationship between economic growth and 
inequality is quite complicated and nonlinear.  More specifically, higher income 
inequality reduces subsequent economic growth.  However, small reductions in income 
inequality also reduce growth – only large reductions in income inequality improve 
economic performance.   
This finding is not inconsistent with a simple political economy bargaining model, in 
that potential reforms/social investment opportunities with substantial growth payoffs 
may lead to costly haggling, but that the (albeit diminished) resulting growth may still 
be higher than the previously prevailing growth rate.  Alternatively, technological 
innovation and private investment outside the purview of the social and political 
bargaining process may lead to both higher economic growth and lower long to 
medium term income inequality.  As a result, the policy implications of this paper 
differ dramatically from those of the original cross-country growth literature in that 
while higher inequality is bad for growth, lower inequality is not necessarily good for 
growth.  Only larger reductions in income inequality are apt to raise economic growth 
rates. 
  The second contribution of this paper is that it demonstrates how other 
economic factors, notably the investment rate, might mitigate and influence the 
relationship between inequality and growth.  More specifically, less developed countries 
with low levels of investment experience lower reductions in their economic growth 
rate in response to an increase in income inequality as compared to more developed 
nations.  This is consistent with the Galor and Moav (2002) capital-skill 
complementarity growth model, whereby in the initial stages of development (when it 
assumed that both physical and human capital are scarce), income inequality promotes 
growth because it channels resources to wealthier households (who are assumed to 
have a higher marginal propensity to save), which raises aggregate savings and 
  15stimulates capital formation.  Consistent with the late-stage development properties of 
the foregoing growth model, this paper also finds that as the investment rate becomes 
substantially large, the ill-effects of higher income inequality subside.  These results 
suggest that policy makers should be less concerned with income inequality in 
developing nations, as an unequal distribution of income may stimulate capital 
formation and help offset the ill-effects of the redistribution of income through political 
economy mechanisms.  Indeed, policies which discourage domestic investment and/or 
encourage capital flight should be absolutely avoided as they would undermine the 








Real GDP per capita (chain weighted)  Penn World (Mark 5.6) 
Investment to GDP ratio  Penn World (Mark 5.6) 
Government expenditure to GDP ratio World Bank Development Indicators (2001) 
Inflation rate  World Bank Development Indicators (2001) 
Fertility rate   World Bank Development Indicators (2001) 
Growth rate of terms of trade  World Bank Development Indicators (2001) 
Primary education completion rate  Barro (Barro/Lee Dataset) 
Gini coefficient  World Bank (Deininger & Squire Dataset) 
Rule-of-Law Index  E. Duflo (originally constructed by Barro) 
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Table 2A 
Nation Observations   Years 
Australia 8    1968-69,1976,1978-79,1981,1985-1986 
Brazil 5    1982-83,1985-1987 
Canada 14    1969,1971,1973-75,1979,1981-87 
Chile 9    1971,1980-1987 
Colombia 5    1970-72,1974,1978 
Costa Rica  8    1969,1971,1977,1979,1981-1983,1986 
Denmark 3    1976,1981,1987 
Spain 6    1973,1975,1980,1985-1987 
Finland 11    1966,1971,1977-1984,1987 
France 5    1965,1970,1975,1979,1984 
United Kingdom  26    1962-1987 
Indonesia 8    1967,1970,1976,1978,1980-81,1984,1987 
India 5    1973,1977,1983,1986-87 
Italy 12    1975-1984,1986-87 
Japan 20    1963-65,1967-82,1985 
Korea, Rep.  7    1969-1971,1976,1980,1982,1985 
Sri Lanka  6    1970,1973,1979-1981,1987 
Mexico 4    1968,1975,1977,1984 
Malaysia 5    1973,1976,1979,1984,1987 
Netherlands 9    1975,1977,1979,1981-83,1985-87 
Norway 7    1967,1973,1976,1979,1984-86 
Pakistan 6    1970-71,1979,1985-87 
Peru 5    1962,1971-72,1981,1986 
Philippines 3    1965,1971,1985 
Sweden 11    1967,1975-76,1980-87 
Thailand 4    1969,1975,1981,1986 
Trinidad and Tobago 3    1971,1976,1981 
United States  26    1962-1987 
Venezuela, RB  5    1977-79,1981,1987 
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Figure 4 
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Conditioning Variable(s) (ξ )  t-statistic 
it gini   2.4369 
1 it gini −   4.6317 
it inv   3.1435 
,  it it gini inv   7.543 
1,  it it gini inv −   8.5026 
1 ,  it it gini gini −   6.5034 
1 , ,  it it it gini gini inv −   12.2661 









Independent Variable  3SLS  FE-GMM FE-IV
1
log(per capita GDP)  0.101  -0.47  0.21638 
 (0.030)*** (0.008)***  (0.03412)*** 
log(per capita GDP) squared  -0.0081  ---  -0.02036 
 (0.0019)***   (0.00204)*** 
Government consumption/GDP  -0.153  ----  -0.00108 
 (0.027)***   (0.0002)*** 
Years of schooling  0.0066  ---  ---- 
 (0.0017)***    
Education completion rate  ---  ---  --- 
      
Years of (male) secondary education  ---  -0.008  -0.00584 
   (0.022)  (0.00126)*** 
Years of (female) secondary education ---  0.074  ---- 
   (0.018)***   
log(total fertility rate)  -0.0303  ---  0.01002 
 (0.0054)***   (0.00104)*** 
Growth rate of terms of trade  0.122  ---  0.00034 
 (0.035)***   (0.06986) 
Investment/GDP 0.062  ---  --- 
 (0.022)***    
Inflation Rate  -0.014  ---  -0.00012 
   (0.009)     (0.00006)** 
1 robust standard errors in parentheses      
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Table 3 
 Average  Values  (1980s)   
  poorest 20%  all nations  richest 20% 
Log GDP per capita  7.48  8.82  9.62 
Gini coefficient  38.87  36.88  34.53 
Investment/GDP (%)  15.54  21.87  23.31 
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Table 4 
investment (%)
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
26 0.0033 -0.0043 -0.0112 -0.0166 -0.02 -0.021 -0.0198 -0.0171 -0.0138 -0.0105 -0.0075 -0.0051 -0.0031 -0.0015 -0.0003
28 0.0016 -0.0049 -0.0105 -0.0149 -0.0177 -0.0187 -0.0178 -0.0157 -0.013 -0.0103 -0.008 -0.0059 -0.0042 -0.0028 -0.0017
30 0.0002 -0.005 -0.0092 -0.0124 -0.0146 -0.0155 -0.0151 -0.0137 -0.0119 -0.0102 -0.0085 -0.0069 -0.0055 -0.0042 -0.0032
32 -0.0009 -0.0046 -0.0073 -0.0093 -0.0108 -0.0117 -0.0119 -0.0116 -0.011 -0.0102 -0.0093 -0.0082 -0.0071 -0.0059 -0.0048
34 -0.0015 -0.0036 -0.0049 -0.0058 -0.0068 -0.0079 -0.0089 -0.0098 -0.0104 -0.0107 -0.0105 -0.0099 -0.0089 -0.0078 -0.0066
36 -0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0033 -0.0048 -0.0068 -0.0089 -0.0106 -0.0116 -0.012 -0.0117 -0.0108 -0.0096 -0.0083
38 -0.0014 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.003 -0.0059 -0.0089 -0.0113 -0.0128 -0.0134 -0.0132 -0.0124 -0.0112 -0.0097
40 -0.0013 0 0.001 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0026 -0.006 -0.0094 -0.012 -0.0136 -0.0142 -0.0141 -0.0133 -0.0121 -0.0106
42 -0.0017 0.0004 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0032 -0.0066 -0.0098 -0.0122 -0.0136 -0.0142 -0.014 -0.0132 -0.0121 -0.0107
44 -0.0026 0.0002 0.0014 0.0009 -0.001 -0.0038 -0.0069 -0.0096 -0.0115 -0.0126 -0.0131 -0.0129 -0.0123 -0.0112 -0.0099
46 -0.0031 -0.0004 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0039 -0.0065 -0.0086 -0.01 -0.0109 -0.0112 -0.0111 -0.0106 -0.0097 -0.0084
48 -0.0022 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0032 -0.0052 -0.0069 -0.008 -0.0087 -0.009 -0.009 -0.0086 -0.0077 -0.0064
50 0.0007 0.0006 0.0009 0.001 0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0032 -0.0047 -0.0057 -0.0064 -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0064 -0.0055 -0.0041
52 0.0052 0.0038 0.003 0.0027 0.0021 0.0009 -0.0006 -0.002 -0.0032 -0.0041 -0.0046 -0.0048 -0.0044 -0.0033 -0.0016
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1 The first empirical papers investigating the link between income inequality and 
economic growth supported the predictions of the theoretical papers written roughly 
during the same era (see Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bertola (1993), Galor and 
Zeira (1993), Perotti (1993), Benabou (1996), Alesina and Perotti (1996)). 
2 Li and Zou (1998) is an extension of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), while Forbes (2000) 
is an extension of Perotti (1996). 
3 Forbes (2000) finds that the length of the growth horizon does matter, effecting the 
sign and/or statistical significance of the coefficient on inequality. 
4 In addition to Forbes, Li and Zou (1998) demonstrated a positive empirical 
relationship between inequality and growth using a fixed effects, 5-year panel variant 
of Alesina and Rodrik (1994). 
5 The control variables used in their include those of Perotti (1996) and Barro (2000). 
6 These results critically hinge on three assumptions: 1) “the marginal propensity to 
save and to bequeath increases with wealth” 2) “the economy is characterized by 
credit constraints that limit individual’s borrowing” and 3) “the economy is 
characterized by capital-skill complementarity.” 
7 The Hausman specification test on the linear panel model strongly rejects the random 
effects specification at any standard level of significance.  The Hausman test statistic 
equals 25.78, which exceeds the 1% critical value of 20.09.  Therefore, the fixed-effects 
specification is used for the remainder of the paper. 
8 Two of Barro’s conditioning variables were omitted: democracy and the rule-of-law 
index.  Because this paper employs a fixed effects panel, and the foregoing variables 
vary little with each country, the economic impact of these variables is captured by 
the fixed effect coefficients. 
9 Under the assumption that (2.1) is correctly specified, a consistent estimate of the 
model’s parameters was obtained by using the one-period lagged values of the 
regressors as instruments.  
10 To prevent the loss of a substantial number of observations, one period lagged 
values of inequality are used instead of five period lags.  While this does not introduce 
any methodological problems, the economic interpretation of m  differs somewhat 
with equation (2.4).  Implicitly, the use of shorter lags captures the short-run effect of 
changes in income inequality on 5-year growth rates, whereas the use of longer lags 
captures the medium-to-long run impact of changes in income inequality on 
subsequent 5-year growth.  
11  For the sake of ease of exposition, this section assumes a balanced panel of N 
countries and T time periods in order to derive and interpret the meaning of the 
estimation methods.  Substantively, little changes if unbalanced panels are used, but 
the general exposition of the methods becomes more tedious. 
12 Mundra (2004) first replaced the nonparametric function m  in her dynamic, 
semiparametric panel model with a first order Taylor series approximation (thus 
placing the higher order terms of the approximation in the residuals).  Next, she 
performed a within transformation (expressing each regressor in terms of deviations 
from country-specific averages), thereby eliminating the country specific fixed effects 
from her model.  Both the current paper and Mundra (2004) use Gaussian product 
kernels. 
13 Because rank , a column from both   and   will be dropped prior 
to estimation. 
  32 
14 As pointed out in Forbes (2000), this counter-intuitive result is common in the 
development/growth model literature (e.g., see Caselli, et. al. (1996)). 
15 As is typical when plotting nonparametric functions, the lowest and highest 10% of 
observations (with respect to inequality) were trimmed from Figures 3 to 5. 
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